A challenging book that argues not the electoral system but the number of ACCESS POINTS are important to produce the policy bias and complexity. The logic is simple: since interest groups are more likely to overcome the collective action problem necessary to the advantaged lobbying compared to the other interested public in general, the more opened the access is to them, the more likely the policy outcome would be of their preference. As far as I understood, the fundamental importance of the author’s argument is (1) it is not necessarily true that the more access to the policy making process would result in more public-regarded policy; and (2) it is not necessarily the electoral system (PR or Westminster) that would set the rule of preference canalization to the policy. The cases to be treated are of the international trade regulation, environmental regulation, bank regulation, etc. I read this book mistakenly considered as if it is the assigned for a study group, however it was not the waste of the time at all.
Tuesday 14:30-18:00, Room 501
*Please contact beforehand.