


# Introduction to Cross-National Time-Series and other data

Statistical analysis of secondary data sources: Introduction to cross-national time series

Oct 7, 2020

Isamu Okada



## **Socioeconomic + Institutional + Behavioral**

- Population
- Identity
- Education
- Health
- Transportation
- Communication infrastructure
- Economic level & growth
- Trade

- State capacity
- Government revenue & expenditure
- Political regime
- Party system
- Electoral results
- Constraints on executives (veto points)

- Perception
- Preference
- Identification
- Experience

**+ Others**



**Quantitative data in categories**

Banks, Arthur S., Wilson, Kenneth A. 2020. Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive. Databanks International. Jerusalem, Israel; see <https://www.cntsdata.com/>

DATABANKS INTERNATIONAL'S *Cross-National Time-Series (CNTS) Data Archive*

[HOME](#) [ABOUT THE DATA](#) [ORDER OPTIONS](#) [HISTORY](#) [CITATIONS](#) [TESTIMONIALS](#) [CONTACT US](#)


**National Domestic Conflict Data:**  
Terrorism and Guerrilla Warfare   Assassinations   Revolutions  
Major Government Crises   Purges   Riots  
General Strikes   Anti-Government Demonstrations

**Political, Legislative and Economic Data**


***CNTS Data Archive 2020 Edition now available***  
*196 variables used by academia, government, finance, social scientists and media*  
*More than 200 years of annual data from 1815 onward*

≡ CNTS data (Arthur Banks')

## Anti-government demonstrations and general strikes in Argentina (1919-2012)



☰ Conflict event data



≡ Papers citing CNTS data

## Political Challenge in Latin America: Rebellion and Collective Protest in an Era of Democratization\*

CHRISTINA SCHATZMAN

*Department of Political Science, University of New Mexico*

Democratization is expected to quell violent political challenge while opening channels for nonviolent opposition. By offering the opportunity for revolutionary groups to promote their interests and seek change without recourse to violence, democracies are expected to stifle violent opposition with inclusion. Yet, revolutionary groups have continued to threaten governments throughout the 1980s and 1990s, a period marked by extensive democratic opening. Meanwhile, democracy is tied to the mobilization of civil society, opening channels for nonviolent challenge to government, arguably increasing instability, especially in the short term. Using a negative binomial event-count model on a pooled cross-sectional sample of 18 Latin American countries for the period 1980–93, this article examines the effects of an array of theoretical determinants on occurrences of violent rebellion and nonviolent collective protest. For rebellion, some traditional expectations are supported, including the role of state capacity and repression, although social development is also identified as an important determinant. For collective protest, repression exerts a demobilizing influence, as expected. Of primary interest, democracy significantly impacts both rebellion and collective protest, although its effect is surprising: increasing democracy promotes violent rebellion while quelling protest overall in the time period under analysis, supporting work suggesting a continuation of political challenge despite recent democratization.



RQ: Were rebellion and collective protest affected by political opening during the transition to democracy in Latin America?


Unit of analysis: country -  
year (1980 to 1993)




Source: Peru.com



Schatzman 2005



Dependent variables = target of explanation




Six variables available in CNTS dataset



Schatzman 2005




# hypothesis



Schatzman 2005

Figure 1. Levels of Political Challenge in Latin America, 1976–93



$F_1$   
Protest

$F_2$   
Rebellion




Schatzman 2005




**Dependent variable**

18 countries x  
14 years = 252 cases



F<sub>1</sub>  
Protest



F<sub>2</sub>  
Rebellion


**Negative binomial model**

R package *MASS*

Function *glm.nb*



**Schatzman 2005**




**Collective protests are likely to happen and increase when**

Lower level of democracy, less repression

**Rebellions are likely to happen and increase when**

Higher level of democracy, lower HDI, lower state capacity, more repression



# ☰ Advantages of CNTS

## Domestic conflict data

- CNTS collects six different types of domestic conflict event-count data from New York Times

## Long-term macro data

- CNTS collects and merges numerous socioeconomic and institutional data from other data sources

# ≡ Disadvantages of CNTS

## Domestic conflict data in more detail

- The larger the scope, the harder would be its interpretation.
- Domestic conflict data is available alternatively.


The more credible are primary sources.

You may be able to find missing data in other sources (and vice versa).

- Intl organizations, governments, NGOs
- Websites, annual and special reports
- Survey archives
- Books



- Start with good RQ & hypothesis
- Check what previous literature uses
- Check multiple sources
- Elaborate correct measurement
- Report results from multiple sources and measurements



## Main Points





# Thank You!

You may want to find other data sources here

\* <https://www2.gsid.nagoya-u.ac.jp/blog/isamuokada/research-data-links/>